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CASE LAW
A. Court of Justice
Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, judgment of the Grand Chamber of
13 September 2005, nyr
1. Introduction
The case annotated here concerns the relationship between EU and EC law
as regards criminal law. In its judgment, the Court of Justice held that crimi-
nal enforcement of EC environmental law may fall under European Commu-
nity law (and thus the EU’s first pillar), rather than being reserved in any
case for the European Union’s third pillar on Police and Judicial Cooperation
in Criminal Matters. The decision is of great importance as it concerns a
hotly debated issue on which there had been no precedent, namely the distri-
bution of competences between the first and third pillars of the European
Union as regards the specification of criminal sanctions in EC law. The im-
portance of the case is made evident by the fact that the judgment was
handed down by the Court sitting as the Grand Chamber. A further indica-
tion of its importance is the fact that no less than eleven Member States sub-
mitted observations (and ten of these actually both in writing and orally).
Finally, the Commission issued a Communication on the implications of the
Court’s judgment,1 a feature that the case shares with such important cases
as Cassis de Dijon2 and Kalanke.3 In this Communication the Commission
argues that, even though the case under discussion concerns criminal law in
the specific field of environment, the Court’s interpretation of the relevant
1. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005 (Case C-176/03, Commission
v. Council), COM(2005)583 fin.
2. Case 120/78, Rewe Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de
Dijon), [1979] ECR 649; Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences
of the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 Feb. 1979 in Case 120/78 (“Cassis de
Dijon”), O.J. 1980, C 256/2.
3. Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie und Hansestadt Bremen, [1995] ECR I-3051;
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the in-
terpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 October 1995 in Case C-450/93,
Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, COM(1996)88 fin.
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EC law has in fact implications for all areas of Community law. As a practi-
cal consequence, the Commission suggests that a number of instruments al-
ready adopted in other fields (both EU third pillar law and Community law)
must be corrected.
2. Facts and legal background
On 4 November 1998, the Council of Europe in Strasbourg opened for signa-
ture the Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal
Law.4 It was the first international convention to criminalize acts causing or
likely to cause environmental damage. Since then, a number of EU Member
States have signed the Convention, though only one of them – Estonia – also
proceeded to ratify it. Among the earliest EU Member States to sign the
Convention was Denmark (which signed the Convention on the first possible
day, 4 Nov. 1998). In 2000, Denmark made a proposal for an EU Framework
Decision on combating serious environmental crime, based on the main ele-
ments of the Council of Europe’s Convention.5 In doing so, Denmark relied
on Article 34(2)(b) TEU, according to which it is possible for an EU Member
State to propose to the Council the adoption of a Framework Decision falling
within the field of application of the EU’s third pillar. On 27 January 2003,
the Council adopted Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA6 on the protection of
the environment through criminal law.7 In Articles 2 and 3, the Framework
Decision laid down a number of particularly serious environmental offences,
committed both intentionally and with negligence (at least serious negli-
gence), in respect of which the Member States were required to prescribe
criminal penalties. Under Article 5, the Member States had to ensure that
these offences were “punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive
penalties including, at least in serious cases, penalties involving deprivation
of liberty”. Article 6 provided for the criminal liability of legal persons. In
4. European Treaty Series No. 172; for the text, see conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
cadreprincipal.htm; for the Explanatory Memorandum on the Convention, see conventions.
coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/172.htm.
5. For the text of the Danish proposal, see Initiative of the Kingdom of Denmark with a
view to adopting a Council framework Decision on combating serious environmental crime,
O.J. 2000, C 39/4.
6. Even though after the Amsterdam revision the name of the third pillar changed from
“Justice and Home Affairs” (JHA) into “Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”
(PJCCM), the Council has continued to use the acronym JHA for measures adopted in the
framework of the third pillar.
7. Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 17 Jan. 2003 on the protection of the envi-
ronment through criminal law, O.J. 2003, L 29/55.
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this case, Article 7 required sanctions that are effective, proportionate and
dissuasive and that include criminal or non-criminal fines. In both types of
cases, other sanctions, of which the Framework Decision gave examples,
were also possible. The Framework Decision was adopted on the basis of Ar-
ticles 29, 31(e) and 34(2)(b) TEU (pre-Nice version).8 As for the legislative
procedure, Article 34(2) TEU required unanimous voting in the Council; the
European Parliament was consulted.
However, by acting within the framework of the EU’s third pillar the
Council disregarded a proposal for a Community Directive on the protection
of the environment through criminal law that had been presented by the
Commission in 2001. The proposed Directive was based on the EU’s first
pillar, namely Article 175(1) EC (which provides for the co-decision proce-
dure as described in Art. 251 EC).9 In the course of the procedure for the
adoption of the Framework Decision, the Commission had repeatedly ob-
jected to the choice of third pillar provisions as a legal basis and insisted on
Article 175 EC instead. In the Commission’s view, there was room for a
Framework Decision only in the sense of a measure complementing the Di-
rective in respect to judicial cooperation in relation to the protection of the
environment through criminal law, but not in relation to Articles 1 to 7 of the
Framework Decision as adopted. The same view was taken by the European
Parliament when it expressed its opinion on both the proposed Directive and
the draft Framework Decision. However, the Council disagreed. In consider-
ation 7 of the preamble to the Framework Decision, the Council states that it
did consider the Commission’s proposal but that it had “come to the conclu-
sion that the majority required for its adoption by the Council can not be ob-
tained. The said majority considered that the proposal went beyond the
powers attributed to the Community by the Treaty establishing the European
Community and that the objectives could be reached by adopting a Frame-
work-Decision on the basis of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. The
Council also considered that the present Framework Decision, based on Ar-
ticle 34 of the Treaty on European Union, is a correct instrument to impose
on the member States the obligation to provide for criminal sanctions.…”. It
was thus that the Framework Decision was adopted against the objections of
both the Commission and the European Parliament. When this happened, the
Commission, supported by the European Parliament, brought an action un-
8. The Nice Treaty entered into force on 1 Feb. 2003 and thus a few days after the adoption
of the Framework Decision. Today, the former Art. 31(e) is Art. 31(1)(e) TEU.
9. The proposal was much criticized; in the Dutch literature, see e.g. Buruma and Somsen,
“Een strafwetgever te Brussel inzake milieubescherming?”, (2001) NJB, 795–797, and M.I.
Veldt Folgia, “(Nog) geen strafrecht in de Eerste Pijler?”, (2002) SEW, 162–169.
cola2006031.pmd 5/16/2006, 12:30 PM837
838 Case law CML Rev. 2006
der Article 35 TEU10 to the Court of Justice for the annulment of the main
provisions of the Framework Decision (i.e. Arts. 1–7).11 In its role as defen-
dant, the Council also received support, from eleven Member States, all of
them “old” Member States (in fact, all the former “EU 15” except Austria,
Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg, but none of the new Member States).
3. Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s Opinion
According to Advocate General (henceforth: A.G.) Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,
what was in issue in the case under discussion was the Council’s duty to re-
frain from adopting the contested provisions “by virtue of the primacy of
Community law, established in Article 47 TEU, since the Community is said
to have power under the Treaty of Rome to require the Member States to give
a response in criminal law to certain threats to the environment” (para 26).
The A.G. therefore started from the (general) question of whether the power
of the Community to require the Member States to punish conduct which
threatens the Community legal order enables the Community to define acts
as criminal offences. The A.G. came to the conclusion that “the case-law
does not explicitly recognize any power on the part of the Community to re-
quire the Member States to classify as criminal offences conduct which hin-
ders achievement of the objectives laid down on the Treaties” (para 38). He
found that the same applies in relation to secondary legislation addressing
the issue of penalties for infringements of the law. However, here the A.G.
observed that on occasion, a criminal penalty becomes imperative because it
is the only sanction which fulfils the requirements of being effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive (para 43). The A.G.’s conclusion at the general level
was that if the legal interests protected in certain offences are objectives of
the Community, no one would dispute the ability of the Community’s law-
making bodies to require the Member States to prosecute in criminal law
(para 50).
Turning to the specific field of environmental law, the A.G. then posed the
question whether environmental protection, as a Community matter, “re-
10. Under Art. 35(6) EU, the ECJ has jurisdiction to review the legality of Framework
Decisions and Decisions in actions brought by a Member State or the Commission on grounds
of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of
the EU Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. Different
from Art. 230 EC which is the corresponding provision in the framework of EC law, there is no
possibility under Art. 35(6) EU for individuals to bring an action for annulment.
11. The remaining Articles (9–12) concern the issues of jurisdiction, extradition and pros-
ecution, implementation, territorial application and the effective date.
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quires the shield of criminal law” (para 51). He concluded that given the
Court’s case law on Community authority to impose sanctions, the develop-
ment of Community environmental law and the fragility of environmental in-
terests, “there are sufficient grounds for acknowledging the Community’s
power to require from Member States a response in criminal law to certain
kinds of conduct which harm the planet”, an outcome that is supported by
democratic considerations (para 75 and 77). According to the A.G., Article
29 TEU does not change this analysis, since it does not give the EU a univer-
sal competence to harmonize criminal law, but rather only a power limited to
certain offences of transnational scope. Given that there is neither any gen-
eral power of the Community in criminal matters under the first pillar, nor
any “natural capacity” of the EU in this field under the third pillar, the deci-
sive issue is the lawful scope of the power of the Community to impose pen-
alties as means of protecting the Community legal order (para 82). In the
A.G.’s view, the Community can constrain the Member States to impose
criminal penalties for uniform offences, but it cannot go further. Rather, the
choice of penalty to admonish conduct which seriously harms the environ-
ment and to ensure the effectiveness of Community law is the province of the
Member States. In other words, the choice of the penalty model (criminal,
administrative or civil) is a matter for the Community and the choice of the
specific form of penalties is for the Member States. The reason for this is,
according to the A.G., that the Community at present lacks the information
necessary to assess the best way to protect the environmental interests in
each Member State. Turning to the Framework Decision at hand, the A.G.
concluded that the offences mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 are very grave and,
that being so, “it is evident that power to decide that such acts should be sub-
ject to criminal penalties lies with the Community” (para 92). In the A.G.’s
analysis, the same applies to the other provisions at issue, with the exception,
however, of Article 5(1) and the second part of Article 7 of the Framework
Decision. Applying his distinction between the choice of a penalty model
and the specific penalties themselves, the A.G. found that Article 5(1) and
the second part of Article 7 transgress the boundaries of the first pillar be-
cause they specify certain types of sanctions.12 Against this background, the
A.G. concluded that “by virtue of the fact that the choice of the criminal law
response to serious offences against the environment is the responsibility of
the Community, the Council has no power to approve Articles 1 to 4, Article
5(1) – with the exception of the reference to sanctions involving the depriva-
12. Under Art. 5(1) the Member States, in serious cases, are obliged to provide for penalties
involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition. Art. 7 concerns sanctions for
legal persons. It gives a list of specific sanctions which may (note: not “must”) be provided for
under national law.
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tion of liberty and extradition – Article 6 or 7(1) of the Framework Decision”
(para 97). In consequence, the A.G. suggested that the Court of Justice
should uphold the Commission’s action and annul the provisions in question.
4. The judgment of the Court
The Court followed the main lines of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s Opinion,
but departed from his conclusion in two respects. First, whilst the A.G. sug-
gested the annulment only of certain provisions of the Framework Decision,
the Court annulled the entire Framework Decision. Second, the Court did not
find that Article 5(1) and the second part of Article 7 are outside Community
competences.
The starting point for the Court’s considerations is Article 47 TEU, ac-
cording to which nothing in the EU Treaty shall affect the Community Trea-
ties and subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them. As
regards criminal law specifically, the Court added that the same requirement
is found in Article 29(1) TEU, under which the European Union, by develop-
ing common action among the Member States in the fields of police and ju-
dicial cooperation in criminal matters inter alia, will provide citizens with a
high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice. From this
starting point, the Court embarked on an analysis of the question of whether
Articles 1 to 7 of the Framework Decision affect the powers of the European
Community under Article 175 EC “inasmuch as those articles could, as the
Commission maintains, have been adopted on the basis of the last-mentioned
provision” (para 40). In answering this question, the Court proceeded in two
steps. First, it emphasized the importance of the protection of the environ-
ment in the framework of Community law as an essential objective of the
Community. In this context, the Court mentioned specifically the duty of
mainstreaming under Article 6 EC and the fact that the legal basis provision
in the field of environment, namely Article 175 EC, includes measures in
fields for which the Community either does not enjoy a specific legislative
competence at all or only on the basis of unanimity within the Council (e.g.
fiscal policy, energy policy and town and country planning policy; paras. 41
et seq.). Second, the Court recalled its settled case law concerning the cor-
rect choice of a legal basis under Community law (the choice must be based
on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, including in par-
ticular the aim and the content of the measure)13 and applied it to Article 175
13. The Court refers to Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide), [1991]
ECR I-2867 and to Case C-336/00, Huber, [2000] ECR I-7699.
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EC in view Articles 1 to 7 of the contested Framework Decision (para 45 et
seq.). The Court found that the aim of the Framework Decision is the protec-
tion of the environment, whilst the context of the contested provisions brings
about partial harmonization of the criminal laws of the Member States, in
particular as regards the constituent elements of various criminal offences
committed to the detriment of the environment. The Court recalled that, as a
general rule, neither substantive nor procedural criminal law fall within the
Community’s competence. However, the Court immediately added that this
“does not prevent the Community legislature, when the application of effec-
tive, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent
national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious environ-
mental offences, from taking measures which relate to the criminal law of
the Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that the
rules which it lays down on environmental policy are fully effective” (para
48). In relation to Articles 1 to 7 of the Framework Decision, the Court ob-
served that they leave the Member States a choice of the measures to apply,
as long as these measures are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The
Court, pointing to the preamble of the Framework Decision, found that
criminal penalties are indeed essential for combating serious offences
against the environment. The Court’s conclusion was, therefore, that, on ac-
count of both their aim and their content, Articles 1 to 7 of the Framework
Decision could have been properly adopted on the basis of Article 175 EC.
This finding means that, because it is indivisible, the entire Framework Deci-
sion “infringes Article 47 EU as it encroaches on the powers which Article
175 EC confers on the Community” (para 53). Finally, the Court added that
Articles 135 and 280(4) EC are immaterial in the present context since they
concern very specific issues only (namely customs cooperation in the case of
Art. 135 EC and the protection of the Community’s financial interests in the
case of Art. 280(4) EC; para 53). As a result of these considerations, the
Court of Justice held that the contested Framework Decision must be an-
nulled.
5. Comments
At the legal level the outcome in the judgment under discussion hinges on
two elements, namely, first, the primacy of EC law over EU law as stated in
Article 47 TEU and, second, the reach of the legislative powers of the Com-
munity in relation to criminal law under the legal basis provision for the field
of environmental law, Article 175 EC.
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5.1. Article 47 TEU
The judgment under the discussion is the first to find that an EU measure
infringes Article 47 TEU. In the earlier Airport transit visa case,14 the Court
held that the Joint Action on airport transit arrangements15 was lawfully
adopted on the basis of what was then Article K.3 of the EU Treaty (now,
after amendment, Art. 31 TEU), as it did not fall under Article 100c EC
(since repealed). Further, none of the cases so far decided in which Article
47 TEU or its predecessor Article M TEU, was mentioned contains elabora-
tions on the meaning of this provision.16 However, at the time of writing, a
new case is pending before the Court of Justice17 where the Commission ar-
gues that Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP18 infringes Article 47 TEU, since
it affects Community powers in the field of development aid. The Court’s
judgment in this case may shed further light on the meaning of Article 47
TEU, as explained in the judgment under discussion.
Article 47 TEU has to be seen against the background of the final part of
Article 1 TEU, where it is stated that the European Union “shall be founded
on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of
cooperation established by this Treaty” (emphasis added). Article 47 TEU
accordingly provides that “nothing in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties es-
tablishing the European Communities”. The same approach is reflected by
the first provision in the title on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal
Matters, Article 29 TEU, which explicitly reserves “the powers of the Euro-
pean Community”. In the judgment annotated here, the Court emphasizes
the role of Article 47 TEU as a preserver of the powers of the Communities:
the competences enjoyed by the Union in the areas of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
are subject to the competences of the two remaining Communities (since the
expiry of the ECSC, these are Euratom and the European Community).
Thus, whenever the EU institutions19 contemplate action under a legal basis
14. Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council, [1998] ECR I-2763.
15. Joint Action 96/197/JAI of 4 March 1996 on airport transit arrangements, O.J. 1996, L
63/8.
16. See Joined Cases C-64 & 65/96, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Kari Uecker and Vera
Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1997] ECR I-3171, para 23, further Airport transit visa
(supra note 14), para 14, and, after the judgment under discussion, Case T-299/04 Abdelghani
Selmani v. Council and Commission, judgment of 18 Nov. 2005, nyr, paras. 49 and 57.
17. Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council, pending.
18. Decision implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to a European Union
contribution to ECOWAS in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, O.J. 2004, L 359/65.
19. As defined through the relevant legal basis provisions in the EU Treaty. Regarding the
Union’s single institutional framework, see Arts. 3–5 TEU.
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provision in the second or the third EU pillar, they must first analyse whether
or not the matter is covered by a Community (first pillar) competence, and if
so, in how far. In order to find out whether a given matter is covered by a
Community competence that excludes action at the level of the second and/
or third EU pillar, the institutions have to analyse the reach of the Commu-
nity legal basis provisions, following the well-known principles set out by
the Court in its long-standing case law (see below). Only if and in so far as
this analysis reveals no Community competence, can the EU institutions act
within the framework of the second and/or third pillar of EU law.
Seen in this way, the relationship between first pillar and second and third
pillar law could be said to be comparable to the relationship between Article
308 EC and other legal basis provisions in the EC Treaty, in particular Ar-
ticles 94 and 95 EC. Just as Article 308 EC can be relied on only if the mat-
ter at issue is not covered by another legal basis provision in the EC Treaty,
the legal basis provisions in the second and third pillar can be relied on only
if the matter does not fall under an EC legal basis provision. Alternatively,
one could speak about some sort of subsidiarity principle on the horizontal
level (namely on the level of the various EU pillars): if and insofar as action
can be taken under the first pillar, there is no room for action under the sec-
ond or the third pillar. Regulation within the framework of these pillars will
therefore always be subsidiary to action under the first pillar.20 However,
from a practical perspective it should be added that it might not always be
easy to draw a clear line between first and second or third pillar matters, es-
pecially when a given issue might be seen as falling under more than one pil-
lar at once. This may be particularly tricky in the context of second pillar
issues.21
Returning to criminal law, which was at issue in the case under discussion:
given the framework just described it is not possible to argue that Articles 29
and 31 TEU create a “derogation” from any supposed EC competence. Also,
it would be a mistake to assume that every issue mentioned in the second and
20. There is, however, an important difference with the EC subsidiarity principle under Art.
5 EC in that Art. 47 TEU does not contain an element relating to the suitability of the level
(Member State or Community) of the envisaged regulation. Whenever there is a competence
under the first pillar, action under the second or third pillar is automatically cancelled out. The
suitability of the level of regulation had been relied on by A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer when he
argued that the Community at present lacks the information necessary to assess the best way to
protect the environmental interests in each Member State (para 48).
21. In a roundtable discussion held at the Europa Institute of Leiden University, in the
Netherlands, in March 2006, Prof. Alan Dashwood mentioned the example of clearing
landmines that can be put in the context of both development cooperation (first pillar) and
common foreign and security policy (second pillar).
cola2006031.pmd 5/16/2006, 12:30 PM843
844 Case law CML Rev. 2006
third pillars of the EU Treaty is actually covered by competences given to the
Union under the relevant provisions. As A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer points
out, the reference in Article 29 TEU to “approximation, where necessary, of
rules on criminal matters in the Member States, in accordance with the pro-
visions of Article 31(e)”22 does not mean that criminal law is intrinsically a
matter for the third pillar. The Union’s competences are limited to specific
fields (though it seems that the Council has not always taken this seri-
ously).23 But even within the field of application of Article 31(1)(e) TEU,
there is still precedence of EC law insofar as there is a Community compe-
tence in criminal matters. In the words of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, such a
competence “cancel[s] out the powers of the Union” (para 27). Against this
background, the decisive question in the case under discussion was whether
and in how far there is an EC competence in criminal matters in relation to
the protection of the environment.
5.2. “EC criminal law” in general
As A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s many references to academic writing show,
the discussion of the influence of EC law on national criminal law has a
longer history than one might expect.24 The same is true for the
Commission’s argument that the EC enjoys competences in the criminal
field, which was made already in the 1980s.25 In approaching the question of
22. Since the Nice revision, there are two distinct sections of this provision, so that the
reference in Art. 29 TEU should read “Article 31(1)(e) TEU”; see already supra note 8.
23. Art. 31(1)(e) TEU refers to the task of “progressively adopting measures establishing
minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields
of organized crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking” (emphasis added). Weyembergh
notes that this has not hindered the Council from adopting measures going beyond the limited
field of application of Art. 31(1)(e) TEU: Weyembergh, “Approximation of criminal law, the
Constitutional Treaty and the Hague Programme”, 42 CML Rev. (2005), 1567–1597, at 1569,
with further references. Corstens and Pradel speak about a double limitation (namely in that the
provision relates to three specific fields and to two aspects – facts of the case and penalties –
only); Corstens and Pradel, European Criminal Law (Kluwer Law International, 2002), at p.
515.
24. See already H.G. Sevenster, Criminal law and EC law, 29 CML Rev. (1992), 29–70.
Besides much recent writing, the A.G. mentions in particular a symposium on the relationship
between Community law and criminal law, held at the University of Parma in 1979. In contrast,
it may be interesting to note that in the proceedings of a conference held at the Institut d’études
européennes of the Université libre de Bruxelles in the year 1968 (Droit penal européen.
Europees strafrecht. European Criminal Law, Brussels, Presses universitaires de Bruxelles,
1970), none of the contribution focuses on what was then EEC law. Rather, attempts at harmo-
nization are discussed in relation to certain smaller groups of European States only.
25. See Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1572.
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whether and in how far there can be EC criminal law, it may be helpful to
rely on one of the leading textbooks on European criminal law such as
Corstens and Pradel26 (chosen for the present purposes because it is available
in French and Dutch27 as well as English). When discussing the influence of
EC law on national criminal law, Corstens and Pradel distinguish between
the positive and negative effects of Community legislation, a distinction that
according to them is closely connected with the concepts of positive and
negative integration.28 The negative effects concern the incompatibility of
provisions of national law with Community law, such as for example in the
Skanavi case29 where the Court held that excessive sanctions for infringe-
ments of national law implementing EC law on driver licences30 are incom-
patible with EC law on the free movement of persons. It is well known that
since the origin of the Community, there have been numerous cases where
individuals tried to use EC law as a shield to fence off accusations of crimi-
nal offences or heavy criminal sanctions which they were facing on the basis
of national law.
In contrast, the positive effect of Community law on national criminal law
concerns active obligations of Member States flowing from Community law
with respect to criminal law. Here, a further distinction can be made between
general and specific obligations of the Member States. The latter concerns
requirements in relation to criminal law imposed on the Member States
through explicit EU or EC law, such as for instance in the context of the
Fisheries Policy.31 In the framework of the former, Corstens and Pradel32 re-
26. Corstens and Pradel, op. cit. supra note 23.
27. Pradel and Corstens, Droit pénal européen (Paris, Dalloz, 2002); Corstens and Pradel,
Het Europese strafrecht (Deventer, Kluwer, 2003), resp.
28. Corstens and Pradel, op. cit. supra note 23, at pp. 505 et seq. On the terms negative and
positive integration as coined by the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen, see Kapteyn, VerLoren
van Themaat, Geelhoed, Mortelmans and Timmermans (Eds), Kapteyn/VerLoren van The-
maat. Het recht van de Europese Unie en van de Europese Gemeemschappen, 6th ed. (Kluwer,
Deventer, 2003), at p. 97.
29. Case C-193/94, Criminal proceedings against Sofia Skanavi and Konstantin Chryssan-
thakopoulos, [ECR] 1996 I-929.
30. Then First Directive 80/1263/EEC on the introduction of a Community driving licence,
O.J. 1980, L 375/1. The Directive itself did not address the issue of sanctions. As there was no
harmonization, general primary law applied (here: free movement of persons).
31. See Art. 31 of Regulation 2847/93/EEC establishing a control system applicable to the
common fisheries policy (O.J. 1993, L 261/1) and Arts. 24 and 25 of Regulation 2371/2002/EC
on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common
Fisheries Policy (O.J. 2002, L 358/59). On international cooperation in the field of fisheries
policy and the protection of the environment, see del Vecchio, “Politica comune della pesca e
cooperazione internazionale in materia ambientale”, (2005) Dir. Un. Eur., 529–544.
32. Corstens and Pradel, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 513.
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fer to the Member States’ duty under Article 10 EC as described by the
Court of Justice in particular in the Greek Maize case.33 As an example, they
mention the Strawberries case,34 where the Court found that France had in-
fringed Article 28 EC by not effectively prosecuting and punishing individu-
als having hindered the import of vegetables and fruit from Spain into France
for years. It is clear that the case under discussion falls within the category
of specific requirements imposed on the Member States through the EU or
the EC in the field of criminal law. In this context, it raised the question of
whether, in the framework of the division of competences both between the
EC and its Member States and between the first and the third EU pillar, spe-
cific requirements in relation to criminal sanctions could lawfully be im-
posed through EC legislation.
5.3. Community competence to require specific criminal sanctions
Strictly speaking, an analysis of the above question must begin with the prin-
ciple of attribution of powers under Article 5 EC. It is well known that no-
where in the Community Treaty is criminal law mentioned as a Community
competence, hence the statement by the Court in the judgment under discus-
sion that, as a general rule, neither substantive nor procedural criminal law
fall within the Community’s competence. However, this is no more than a
general rule. Indeed, it is undisputed that this rule does not mean that Com-
munity law is irrelevant for the purposes of national criminal law. The ques-
tion is rather one of degree.35 As was stated earlier, the A.G. thought that the
Community’s competences extend only to the choice of the penalty model
but not to the determination of specific penalties. The Court, however, con-
firmed the Commission’s and the European Parliament’s view that these
33. Case C-68/88, Commission v. Greece, [1989] ECR 2965. In this case, the Court ex-
plained in relation to the Member States’ duties under Art. 10 EC that, “whilst the choice of
penalties remains within their [i.e. the Member States’] discretion, they must ensure in particu-
lar that infringements of Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural and
substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a simi-
lar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate
and dissuasive”.
34. Case C-265/95, Commission v. France, [1997] ECR I-6959.
35. On the different views concerning Community competences in the criminal field, see
the literature indicated by A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, and more recently e.g. Weyembergh, op.
cit. supra note 23, at 1571; Stiebig, “Strafrechtsetzungskompetenz der Europäischen Gemein-
schaft und Europäisches Strafrecht: Skylla und Charybdis einer europäischen Odyssee?”,
(2005) EuR, 466–493; Gleß, in Schomburg, Lagodny, Gleß and Hackner, Internationale
Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, 4th ed. (Munich, Beck, forthcoming, 2006), vor Hauptteil III, para
9a.
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competences may include a (certain) specification of the type of penalty to
be imposed. It should be noted that on the general level of its analysis there
is no explicit statement by the Court to that effect and neither does the Court
expressly address the distinction made by A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer. In-
stead, the Court only very generally states that the Community legislature
may, under certain circumstances, “take measures which relate to the crimi-
nal law of the Member States”. That this includes the specification of the
type of penalty or penalties becomes clear only on the basis of the later state-
ment that Articles 1 to 7 of the Framework Decision could have been prop-
erly adopted on the basis of Article 175 EC. Also, it is not entirely clear from
the judgment how far the competence to specify penalties goes. In particular,
the Court’s reference to the choice that is still left to Member States might be
read as meaning that the Community must indeed leave a certain room for
action to the Member States and cannot ultimately determine which specific
penalty must follow a specific offence.36
This raises the question of whether perhaps the arguments used by the
Court when speaking about Community competence in the criminal field can
explain the extent of the Community’s competence in this field. It is submit-
ted that they do not explain it, or at least not in a clear manner that would
rule out all doubts and questions. The Court bases its finding on two general
and very important concepts of Community law, namely the full effective-
ness (or effet utile) of this law and the concept of effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions: where such sanctions are essential for combating seri-
ous environmental offences, then criminal law measures of the Community
are possible if the Community legislature considers them necessary in order
to ensure that its rules are fully effective. The proud history of the argument
of effectiveness in EC law is well known.37 Under the Court’s judgment, it is
sufficient that the Community institutions consider criminal measures neces-
sary for the purposes of the effectiveness of EC law, not that they prove it to
be necessary. Though this undoubtedly means that the institutions must rea-
sonably consider such measures necessary, it would nevertheless seem that it
36. If so, this would mean that the Community could not adopt a measure containing a
provision such as Art. 4(2) of Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combat-
ing corruption in the private sector, O.J. 2003, L 192/54. Under Art. 4(2), the Member States
are obliged to “take the necessary measures to ensure that the conduct referred to in Article 2 is
punishable by a penalty of a maximum of at least one to three years of imprisonment”. Frame-
work Decision 2003/568/JHA is on the Commission’s list of measures that are either entirely
or partly incorrect in view of their wrong legal basis and should be corrected; see note 55 infra.
37. See e.g. Snyder, “The effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, pro-
cesses, tools and techniques”, (1993) MLR, 19–54, and Hinton, “Strengthening the effective-
ness of Community law: Direct effect, Article 5 EC, and the European Court of Justice”, (1999)
NYU Journal of Int. Law & Politics, 307–348.
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is very easy to pass this test. In the case under discussion the Court simply
states that the acts listed in Article 2 of the Framework Decision include a
considerable number of Community measures that were listed in the pro-
posed Directive. It is not entirely clear what this implies and, in particular,
whom the Court sees as the Community legislature in this specific context:
the Commission and the Parliament, who had agreed on the necessity of
Community action, or perhaps the Council which, even though acting in the
framework of the second pillar, in doing so nevertheless showed in a general
sense that it considered action necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness
of the Community legislation? Whatever the correct interpretation, the fact
remains that under Article 175 EC the Community legislature certainly in-
cludes the Council – which, in the case under discussion, was, precisely, not
acting in its capacity of Community institution.
As for the concept of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions,38 it
does not really clarify matters either, at least not as defined in the case law
hitherto handed down by the Court of Justice. A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
rightly speaks about an “undefined legal concept” (the title of the section
starting with para 44). Where this concept applies independently of written
law specifying its meaning, its interpretation depends on the specific circum-
stances of each individual situation. Nevertheless, there are certain concrete
elements in the Court’s case law, for example in relation to discriminatory
dismissals in the context of social law.39 Further, it is submitted that at least
38. The concept of effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties was originally devel-
oped through the Court’s case law on individuals’ rights under EC sex discrimination law,
namely in the framework of the interpretation of Art. 6 of Directive 76/207/EEC in its original
version (Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and
working conditions, O.J. 1976, L 39/40; the Directive has since been amended through Direc-
tive 2002/73/EC amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational
training and promotion, and working conditions, O.J. 2002 L 269/15. In the amended version,
the right to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions is explicitly stated in Arts. 6 and
8d.). Later, the concept of effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties became a general
feature of EC law; see Tobler (for the European Commission’s European Network of Legal
Experts in the non-discrimination field), Remedies and Sanctions in EC non-discrimination
law (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005), at pp.
12 et seq., with further references.
39. For this particular situation, the Court has held that one of two alternative remedies
must be adopted, namely either reinstatement of the victim of discrimination, or financial com-
pensation for the loss and damage sustained (Case C-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton and
South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Marshall II), [1993] ECR I-4367, para 25).
This is a mere minimum, and other remedies may be necessary in addition; see Tobler, op. cit.
supra note 38, at pp. 11 and 33 (stating that this case law applies also outside the area of sex
equality law).
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since von Colson and Kamann40 it has been clear that the Member States’
duty to provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in the
event of infringements of Community law may include the duty to impose
criminal sanctions even where there is no explicit written Community law on
the matter.41 However, so far there had been no statement in the Court case
law that, if applied at the level of Community legislation itself, the need for
effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions may require specification of
the penalties by the Community, rather than by the Member States. Very im-
portantly, the judgment under discussion implies that the requirements of ef-
fectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness may indeed require such
action. It is submitted that whilst this may appear to be a circular conclusion,
it is in reality simply a new element established by the Court in approaching
the otherwise largely “undefined concept” of effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions. Even though this development may be somewhat sur-
prising at first sight – at least for those who are, perhaps, more familiar with
national criminal law than with general features of Community law –, in that
sense the new element fits well in the general picture as just described and as
such is convincing.
The question that remains is when precisely effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions are essential for combating serious environmental of-
fences. The Court’s answer to this question is extremely short, namely that it
is apparent from the preamble to the Framework Decision that the Council
“took the view that criminal penalties were essential”. It is submitted that it
is here that the Court’s approach is least convincing. After all, the Court it-
self had previously established an objective test under which the penalties
must in fact be an essential measure for combating serious environmental of-
fences.42 In fact, one may have some sympathy for the argument put forward
by the Dutch Government, according to which the Community may require
the Member States to provide for the possibility of punishing certain conduct
40. Case 14/83, von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein Westfalen, [1984] ECR 1891.
41. In Marshall II (supra note 39), para 18, the Court gave examples of appropriate rem-
edies for the discriminatory refusal to hire a candidate under EC sex equality law (namely
offering the post or granting adequate financial compensation) which must be “backed up
where necessary by a system of fines”. Though the Court did not specify the nature, administra-
tive or criminal, of the fines, it seems obvious that penal sanctions may be required in the
context of the requirement of dissuasiveness of the sanctions chosen; see Tobler, op. cit. supra
note 38), at p. 11, with further references.
42. Similarly, the Commission in its Communication on the implications of the judgment
under discussion (note 1, supra) speaks of the requirement that “there is a clear need to combat
serious shortcomings in the implementation of the Community’s objectives and to provide for
criminal law measures to ensure the full effectiveness of a Community policy or the proper
functioning of a freedom”. On the Commission’s Communication, see below.
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under national criminal law, provided that the penalty is inseparably linked to
the relevant substantive Community provisions and that it can actually be
shown that imposing penalties under criminal law in that way is necessary
for the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty in the area concerned. The
Dutch Government argued that the required necessity had not been shown in
the present case (paras. 36 et seq.). It is submitted that rather than simply re-
ferring to the Council’s view on this matter, the Court of Justice might have
referred to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the protection of the envi-
ronment through criminal law43 and its background materials. There are also
recent studies on the subject that underline the necessity of tough action.44
However, from a practical perspective it might have been better for the Court
not to state a strictly objective test (which may be very difficult if not impos-
sible to pass) but rather a test requiring that the application of effective, pro-
portionate and dissuasive criminal penalties appears an essential measure for
combating serious environmental offences.
5.4. Overall conclusions and the judgment’s practical consequences
In the end, the Court’s finding that the Community competences under Ar-
ticle 175 EC would indeed have covered action such as provided for by Ar-
ticles 1 to 7 of the Framework Decision logically led to the conclusion that,
given the primacy of EC law over EU law, there is no room for correspond-
ing action under Article 31 TEU. It is submitted that on the whole (that is,
with the above reservation in relation to the objective test) the Court’s judg-
ment is convincing, in particular in relation to the implications of the con-
cept of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and in relation to the
general meaning of the primacy of Community law over EU law under Ar-
ticle 47 TEU.45 In the present writer’s view, the Council’s objection that, in
43. See note 4 supra.
44. Faure and Heine (Eds.), Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law in the European
Union (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2005). This study found that the use of criminal
sanctions other than fines is relatively rare and that corporate crimes are often only punished
through administrative sanctions. See also Faure and Heine (Eds.), Environmental criminal
law in the European Union. Documentation of the main provisions with introductions (Frei-
burg i.Br.: Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, 2000).
45. It is clear that the relationship between EC and EU law will continue to be an important
issue in the Court’s case law. Thus, a recent judgment concerned the rules on the Schengen
Information System which have to interpreted and applied in conformity with EC law on free
movement of persons (Case C-503/03, Commission v. Spain, judgment of 31 Jan. 2006, nyr).
Another example: Ireland has announced that it will contest EC law on data retention, based on
the argument that such law should be adopted under the second pillar of the EU (“Ireland to
contest data retention law at EU Court”, euobserver of 15 Dec. 2005).
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view of its considerable significance for the sovereignty of the Member
States, there can be no implicit transfer through Article 175 EC of the Mem-
ber States’ powers in criminal law (para 26), seems to forget that the EC
Treaty does not contain a catalogue of negative competences. In other words,
there are no fields where Community action or the influence of Community
law would be ruled out absolutely and categorically. Rather, the past has re-
peatedly shown that the lack of such a “black list” may lead the Court to find
that a “delicate” area hitherto considered a matter for the Member States is
indeed within the reach of Community law.46
The judgment under discussion has important practical consequences,
which concern, first, the differences between first pillar and third pillar leg-
islative instruments. Weyembergh47 in this context rightly notes that the
Court’s decision strengthens the laws and methods of the Community
(though in her opinion the Constitutional Treaty would have provided for an
even better approach).48 A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer mentioned the relevant
differences at the very beginning of his Opinion, when pointing out that, un-
der the present law, Community legislative instruments are much stronger
than Framework Decisions (para 4). Not only do the latter not have direct ef-
fect (Art. 34(2)(b) EC),49 failure to transpose them cannot be overcome us-
ing an action for infringement and, in addition, the Court’s jurisdiction to
46. An example is provided by the application of the rules on free movement in the field of
direct taxation outside the field of free movement of workers (where Art. 7(2) of Regulation
1612/68/EEC on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, (O.J. 1968, L 257/
2), early on indicated the relevance of EC law for direct taxation). After the first taxation case
(Case 270/83, Commission v. France (Avoir Fiscal), [1986] ECR 273), the Court’s case law on
indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality in the context of differentiations made on the
basis of tax or fiscal residence was of particular importance; see Tobler, Indirect Discrimina-
tion. A Case Study into the Development of the Legal Concept of Indirect Discrimination under
EC Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005), at pp. 175 et seq. Another example concerns the applica-
tion of EC non-discrimination law to employment in the Member States military forces (begin-
ning with Case C-273/97, Angela Maria Sirdar v. The Army Board and Secretary of State,
[1999] ECR I-7403); see Tobler, “Kompetenzanmassung der EG via den EuGH? Zur Recht-
sprechung des EuGH über die Anwendbarkeit des EG-Gleichstellungsrechtes auf Arbeitsver-
hältnisse in den Streitkräften der Mitgliedstaaten”, (2000) Aktuelle Juristische Praxis,
577–587.
47. Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 23 at 1573.
48. On the Constitutional Treaty, see also Stiebig, op. cit. supra note 35, at 487 et seq., and
Klip, “The Constitution for Europe and Criminal Law: a step not far enough”, (2005) MJ, 115–
123.
49. Though in Pupino (Case C-105/03, Maria Pupino, judgment of 16 June 2005, nyr), para
38 et seq., the Court emphasized the right of individuals to invoke a Framework Decision in
order to obtain a conforming interpretation of national law before the courts of the Member
States. Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 23 at 1595, speaks about a “palliative measure” cre-
ated by the ECJ.
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give preliminary rulings in accordance with Article 35 TEU is not binding,
since that jurisdiction is subject to acceptance by the Member States. In
other words, in terms of enforcement, an EU Framework Decision is a con-
siderably weaker instrument than an EC Directive. Later in his opinion, the
A.G. also mentioned an argument of a democratic nature, namely that, de-
pending on the legislative procedure, the influence of the European Parlia-
ment in adopting a Directive can be much stronger than in the case of a
Framework Decision where it has in any case only a consultative function.
The A.G. argued – convincingly, in my opinion – that in the framework of
the nulla poena sine legem rule, citizens have a right that criminal offences
are determined by democratically elected representatives (para 77).50
Secondly, the Commission in its Communication51 has suggested that the
Court’s judgment has practical consequences that go far beyond the specific
area of environmental law. According to the Commission, the same argu-
ments can be applied in their entirety to the other common policies and to
the four freedoms (para 6). In other words, the provisions of criminal law re-
quired for the effective implementation of Community law are generally a
matter for the Community Treaty, though with the exception of what the
Commission calls “horizontal criminal law provisions” aimed at encouraging
police and judicial cooperation in the broad sense, which fall within the sec-
ond pillar of the EU (para 11). In fact, the Commission argues that every EC
law competence also implies a potential competence in the criminal field, an
approach that might be seen as a new type of doctrine of implied powers.52 It
should be noted that this broad interpretation is not based on the wording of
the Court’s judgment, which in the key paragraph 48 specifically and only
refers to the protection of the environment. However, if one considers the
background of the Court’s statement, namely the two generally applicable
concepts of full effectiveness of EC law and of effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions, it appears only logical that the Court’s reasoning in re-
lation to environmental protection may also apply in other contexts.53 In ad-
50. See also Weyembergh, supra note 23, at 1593 et seq., and Stiebig, supra note 35, at 482.
It should be remembered that here the argument of democratic representation is made in the
framework of a discussion between the relationship of first pillar and second pillar EU law, and
not in the framework of the relationship between EC/EU law and national law. In the latter
context, it might easily be argued that, given that under the EC Treaty the European Parliament
is usually no more than a co-legislator, the democratic representation would be stronger on the
national level.
51. See supra, note 1.
52. The term is normally used in the context of the Communities powers in the field of
external relations (ERTA doctrine); see recently Case C-433/03, Commission v. Germany,
judgment of 14 July 2005, nyr, and Opinion 1/03 of 7 Feb. 2006 nyr.
53. In the same sense, Douma and Hartmanova, “EC or EU Pillar – Criminal enforcement
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dition, other issues covered by EC law will also belong to the Community’s
essential objectives, just like environmental protection. It can therefore not
be said that the Court’s judgment is due only to the special importance of EC
environmental law. However, even though the Commission does not mention
this in its Communication, it should be added that Community competence
in criminal law is ruled out in two provisions for two specific areas, namely
Art. 280(4) EC (concerning the prevention of and fight against fraud affect-
ing the financial interests of the Community) and Article 135 EC (concern-
ing the strengthening of customs cooperation).54
Interestingly, the Commission in stating the conditions for Community ac-
tion in the criminal field mentions not only the necessity for such action but
also an element that does not appear in this form in the Court’s judgment,
namely consistency (para 13). The Commission rightly emphasizes that the
Community action must respect the overall consistency of the European
Union’s system of criminal law to ensure that criminal provisions do not be-
come fragmented and ill-matched. Against this background, the Commission
then states that a number of Framework Decisions adopted by the Council
are either entirely or partly incorrect in view of their wrong legal basis and
should be corrected (paras. 14 et seq.).55 The Commission now plans to
of European environmental law”, 11 European Law Reporter (2005), at 417.
54. Though Stiebig (supra note 35), at 483 et seq., argues that Art. 280(4) EC does indeed
include a competence of the Community to adopt criminal law provisions.
55. The relevant measures are listed in the annex to the Communication. Besides the
Framework Decision annulled in the judgment under discussion, this list includes the following
four Framework Decisions presently in force:
– Framework Decision of 6 Dec. 2001 amending Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on
increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in con-
nection with the introduction of the euro, O.J. 2001, L 329/3, as amended;
– Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash
means of payment, O.J. 2001, L 149/1;
– Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the pri-
vate sector, O.J. 2003, L 192/54;
– Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information
systems, O.J. 2005, L 69/67.
In the framework of the “double-text mechanism”, the list further includes the following
three combinations of Directives and Framework Decisions:
– Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for
the purpose of money laundering, O.J. 1991, L 166/77, and Framework Decision of 26 June
2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of
instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, O.J. 2001, L 182/1;
– Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 Nov. 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorized entry,
transit and residence, O.J. 2002, L 328/17) and Framework Decision of 28 Nov. 2002 on the
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit
and residence, O.J. 2002, L 328/1;
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– Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 Sept. 2005 on
ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, O.J. 2005, L 255/
11, and Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the criminal-law
framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, O.J. 2005, L 255/164.
56. This concerns Framework Decision 2006/667/JHA, as mentioned in note 55.
* Law faculties of the University of Basel and the University of Leiden.
present proposals aiming at correcting the legal basis in such cases. (In one
case and pending the adoption of such a proposal, the Commission has de-
cided to ask the Court for an annulment.)56 On the practical level, therefore,
the effect of the Court’s judgment as interpreted by the Commission would
appear to be a major shift in the legislative approach to criminal matters un-
der EC and EU law. In the words of the Commission, it “brings to an end the
double-text mechanism” that has been used in the past, meaning a mecha-
nism whereby the substance of a given policy was regulated in the frame-
work of EC law and criminal law aspects in the framework of EU law (para
11). Whether the approach announced by the Commission will work remains
to be seen in the reactions of the Member States (through the Council) to the
Commission’s proposals. Should these be negative, it may be expected that
the Commission, again, will try to take the matter to the Court of Justice.
However, in a situation where the two months period under Article 230 EC
has expired, the only possibility would seem to be an action under Article
232 EC, concerning the individual Member State’s failure to act (namely the
failure to agree to a measure that in view of the effectiveness of EC law
needs to be adopted). Surely, this in turn would provide EC lawyers with yet
another type of new and interesting case law on the enforcement of EC law.
Christa Tobler*
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